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1. Introduction 
Financial markets tend to be highly sensitive to regulatory changes. The 
premium they place on static and dynamic efficiency is instrumental in deciding 
which intermediation channels, financial instruments, risk management 
techniques, and financial centers are used. Small changes in the legal and 
regulatory overlay of the market can create dramatic shifts in financial flows. 
Regulation creates both benefits and costs, and the balance between the two – 
the “net regulatory burden” [Kane, 1983, 1989]  – can elicit important responses 
on the part of the users of capital, investors and financial intermediaries.  
 A number of studies have focused on the interaction between the legal 
infrastructure and financial markets [REFS] but few have addressed distinctly 
international aspects involving treaties and conventions signed and ratified by 
sovereign states, thereby subjecting domestic financial law and regulation to 
external constraints. In doing so, countries cede a certain degree of national 
sovereignty in return for what are presumed to be significant financial gains that 
accrue to market participants, the real sector of the economy, and society at 
large. 
 Once such case is the Cape Town Convention and Protocol covering 
international mobile assets, specifically commercial aircraft and related 
equipment, which came into force in 2004. An earlier paper [Saunders et al, 
2001] attempted to document some of the key benefits. This paper reexamines 
these financial impacts using a contemporary dataset by applying sensitivity 
analysis to a range of capital cost savings under alternative financing structures 
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as well as regression analysis and event study analysis applied to the cost of 
capital and share prices of the airline end-users. 
 
2. The Legal Background 
During the late1990s, the UN agency that deals with private law 
conventions, the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), and the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) joined to create a legal framework under 
which lenders and lessors with a financial interest in aircraft, aircraft engines and 
certain other mobile equipment would have clear title to the collateral in the event 
of bankruptcy or other interruption of debt service. The objective was to reduce 
barriers posed by the variety of approaches in local legal systems to security and 
title reservation rights, which either do not protect lenders in the event of default 
or are unpredictable – i.e., to reduce creditors' uncertainty by providing secure 
and readily enforceable rights in aircraft and related equipment. In this effort, they 
were supported by Airbus, Boeing, various national export credit agencies, and 
major international financial institutions. 
A diplomatic conference held at Cape Town, South Africa in November 
2001 resulted in the Cape Town Convention and Protocol, with the legal texts 
signed by 29 countries including the United Kingdom and the United States. The 
Convention entered into force on 1 April 2004. It established an international 
interest which is recognized in all contracting states, alongside an electronic 
international register for commercial airframes, engines and helicopters. The 
intent of the registry is to reduce creditor uncertainty – prospective creditors can 
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be sure of the priority of their interest at the time of financing or any change in 
financial arrangements. Moreover, any country that has ratified the Convention 
and Protocol commits creditors to deregister the aircraft and procure its export, 
take possession or control of the aircraft, sell or grant a lease in the aircraft, and 
collect or receive income or profits arising from the management or use of the 
aircraft. 
Key articles of the Convention define “international interest,” criteria for an 
international interest to be constituted, and creation of an international registry for 
the registration, amendment, extension or discharge of actual and prospective 
international interests, assignments, acquisitions, registrable non-consensual 
rights and interests, and notices of national interests. The registered international 
interest will generally have priority over the unregistered interest even if the 
registered international interest was registered with actual knowledge of the 
unregistered interest. Once a country has ratified the Convention, withdrawal or 
change in the terms of ratification do not affect pre-existing protection of the 
Convention. The courts of a contracting state selected by the parties and the 
courts of contracting state of which the aircraft is situated have jurisdiction to 
grant orders with respect to preservation of the aircraft and its value, 
immobilization, interim utilization, possession, control and custody of the aircraft.1
 The Cape Town Convention is accompanied by a Protocol which extends 
the provisions of the Convention to outright sales and specifies remedies in the 
event of default or insolvency. Countries have two options. One is a “hard 
regime” under which the administrator must give the creditor the opportunity to 
                                                 
1 For a full set of documents, see UNIDROIT [2006]. 
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take possession of the aircraft if after a specified waiting period the insolvency 
administrator or debtor is unable to cure all defaults and agree to perform all 
future obligations.2 Under this regime, the court has no powers of intervention to 
stay the enforcement, and the insolvency debtor must preserve the aircraft and 
maintain it and its value until the creditor is given the opportunity to take 
possession. The alternative is a “soft regime,” under which the debtor must give 
notice to the creditor within the waiting period whether it is able to cure all 
defaults and agree to perform all future obligations or whether it will give the 
creditor the opportunity to take possession of the aircraft. If the insolvency debtor 
fails to give notice, the court may permit the creditor to take possession upon 
such terms as the court may order. Obviously the “hard regime” is preferable to 
creditors, as is a short waiting period such as 60 days.3  
As part of the implementation process for the Cape Town Convention and 
Protocol, the Secretary General of the International Civil Aviation Authority 
(ICAO) issued a global tender in January 2004 for an organization to establish 
and operate the International Registry as required under the Treaty. Aviareto, a 
Dublin-based joint venture of SITA SC (a Geneva-based information technology 
firm specializing in the aviation sector) and the Irish Government won the tender 
and contracted with the ICAO to perform the registry  functions on a not for profit, 
cost recovery basis. The Registry is the vehicle for protecting international 
interests under the Cape Town Convention, including identification of all parties 
with registered claims on airborne assets. The registry went “live” on March 1, 
                                                 
2  An analysis of the key provisions is contained in Goode [2004]. 
3 For a summary, see Bird & Bird at http://www.twobirds.com/english/publications/articles/ 
Cape_Town_Convention.cfm, 8 March 2006. 
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2006, by which time the Cape Town Convention had been signed by 32 
countries4 and ratified by 9 countries – the protocol had come into force three 
months after the eighth ratification.5   
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the financial gains from this 
international legal initiative – savings that could accrue to the airlines based in 
countries that sign and ratify the Cape Town Convention and Protocol.6 
 
3. Demand Estimates 
 Both Boeing and Airbus have projected rapid growth in new aircraft 
demand the over 2004-2023 period. In particular, Boeing projects a market 
demand for commercial aircraft of around $2 trillion over the next two decades, 
with demand for around 25,000 new airframes [Boeing, 2004]. Table 1 provides 
the Boeing delivery projections. An increasing share of the global passenger 
traffic is forecast to be taken up by non-American airlines. For example, Airbus 
predicts that the US domestic share of world traffic will decline from 20.4% in 
2002 to 13% in 2022 [Airbus, 2004]. Both forecasts predict strong growth in 
emerging markets, particularly in Asia and the Middle East, with the least rapid 
growth in the U.S.  
 Given these comparative air traffic growth expectations -- linked to the 
higher relative growth rate in the purchasing needs of non-American airlines such 
                                                 
4 Burundi, Canada, Chile, China, Congo, Cuba, France, Germany, Ghana, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sudan, Switzerland, Tanzania, Tonga, Turkey, 
Ukraine and the United Kingdom. 
5 Ethiopia, Ireland, Malaysia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Senegal and the United States. 
6 We use Boeing’s Current Market Outlook [2004] to obtain forecasts of demand for future aircraft 
deliveries between 2004 to 2023. We then use these forecasts to estimate the cost savings to 
airlines and countries that sign and ratify the Aircraft Protocol.   
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as those in Asia, the Middle East, Latin American, Eastern Europe and Africa -- 
the question of availability and cost of external finance to airlines becomes 
crucial. It is in the context of this rapid projected growth in new commercial 
aircraft purchases that the benefits of the Convention, and its potential for 
allowing carriers to move along the financing continuum toward improved levels 
of debt quality, will be evaluated.  
The  Convention will potentially allow emerging market airlines access to 
secured debt on a commercial basis as well as to international capital markets by 
avoiding in whole or in part the conventional country-risk premium, and will give 
airlines increased and lower cost access to securitized global debt markets 
through enhanced debt ratings. In particular, the ability of emerging market 
airlines to better access the secured debt markets should be a major direct 
benefit to these carriers, as well as to the countries in which they are based. A 
further, indirect source of benefit is the reduction or elimination of required 
sovereign debt guarantees covering airline debt in emerging market economies. 
This will help to make marginal carriers commercially viable and free-up scarce 
financial resources for use in other economic development areas in the countries 
concerned.  
 
4. Methodology for Estimating Cost Savings  
We adopt the following approach to estimating the cost savings that may 
accrue to each country that signs and ratifies the Cape Town Convention and the 
Protocol.  
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First, we calculate a set of estimates for savings that would accrue, per 
dollar of airline debt, if signing the Convention were to have resulted in an 
improvement in the debt ratings of the airline involved. For example, it is possible 
to calculate the savings that would be likely to result if the rating of an airline’s 
bonds were to improve from BBB to A.  The results derived from this analysis can 
be thought of as a “what-if” scenario in the sense that, if a given airline were to 
see an improvement in its rating from BBB to A, what are its savings per dollar of 
external debt financing that it obtains? 
The principle that underlies our methodology is as follows: Adoption of the  
Convention and Protocol is likely to result in an increase in the credit ratings of 
bonds or other forms of debt contracted by airlines in a given country. This 
improvement in credit ratings will tend to result in a decrease in the interest rate 
that those airlines would have to pay on the debt. The resulting savings will 
depend on (a) the size of the decrease in interest costs (or coupon payments) 
which in turn will impact the repayment amount during the life of the debt, (b) the 
structure of the debt itself, and (c) the discount rate used to determine the 
present value of savings over time to the airline borrower. We specify the 
assumptions underlying our analysis in the next three subsections of this paper, 
prior to undertaking the actual estimates of potential cost savings. 
  
4.1 Assumptions Regarding Changes in Financing Costs 
 Given the divergent nature of airlines in various countries operating in very 
different legal and financing environments, it is difficult to predict the extent to 
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which credit ratings would improve as a result of application of the Convention, 
and thus the amount by which the interest cost of financing would decline. To 
circumvent this problem, we first analyze the effect of a rating increase of 1 notch 
(for example for BB- to BB) for all ratings. Thus, each airline could, at its existing 
rating, estimate its cost savings if its rating went up one notch due to its home 
country signing and ratifying the Cape Town Convention and Protocol.  
In actuality, an airline may achieve a rating increase of more than one 
notch. To illustrate this, we also examine the impact of an improvement in ratings 
from BBB to AAA and from CCC to BBB.   In the latter case this would move the 
debt of the airline from “junk” or “non-investment grade” status to investment 
grade status.  
Lastly, a key element in the potential savings attributable to the Cape 
Town Convention and Protocol is likely to be the difference between the interest 
cost of secured and unsecured debt. We therefore examine the possible impact 
of this change in the structure of aircraft financing. Here the aggregate savings 
estimates are likely to be biased upward to the extent that significant amount of 
aircraft financing is in the form of secured loans and leases in countries which 
already provide the equivalent protection to lenders and lessors (e.g., Canada 
and the United States) or have comparable legal protections. The net gains in 
such countries will tend to be much smaller that in the case of countries that do 
not have such protections in secured financings. 
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4.2 Assumptions Regarding Type of Aircraft Financing Debt 
We assume that the maturity of aircraft financing debt is 12 years. We 
examine the effect of repayment of the debt under two different repayment 
schedules: (i) We assume that the debt is repaid in equal annual installments 
over a 12 year period.  (ii) We assume that the entire principal amount of the debt 
is repaid at maturity at the end of 12 years (a “bullet” bond or loan).  
 
4.3 Assumptions Regarding the Discount Rate 
Lastly, we need to find an appropriate discount rate to calculate the 
present value of the savings conditional on a given rating upgrade and a given 
debt structure. Assuming a rating upgrade, the appropriate discount rate would 
be the interest rate that the airline pays after the upgrade. However, to bias our 
estimates on the conservative side, we use the simple average of the interest 
rate that the airline paid before the rating upgrade and the interest rate after the 
presumptive upgrade in its credit rating. As such, this higher discount rate is 
likely to result in estimates of the present value of savings that represent the 
lower bound of the true cost savings.  
 
4.4 Alternative Ways of Calculating Potential Savings 
We utilize three different methods to calculate airline savings, given our 
aforementioned assumptions regarding (1) the type of debt, (2) the savings due 
to an increase in ratings, and (3) the discount rate enumerated in Sections 3.0.1-
3, above. 
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Method 1: Fully-amortized debt - present value of annuity savings. We 
assume that financing is in the form of 12-year debt that is fully amortized. 
Repayment occurs on an annual basis in equal annuity payments. Assume a 
country that signs and ratifies the  Convention and its Protocol were to benefit 
from an increase in the credit rating of its airlines from BB- to BB+. The annuity 
payments for a given aircraft loan, lease or bond in the BB- category would 
naturally be higher than those obtained in the BB+ category due to the higher 
cost of BB- debt relative to BB+ debt. We then take the difference in annuity 
payments and discounted back to the present at a discount rate equal to the 
average of the two interest rates – namely, the current yield (interest rate) for a 
BB- bond and that for a BB+ bond -- to obtain an estimate of the present value of 
the savings to the airline. This present value represents one estimate of the total 
savings per dollar borrowed over the entire life of the debt.  
 
Method 2: Balloon payment at maturity - present value of interest savings. 
We assume that the 12-year loan or bond has full (bullet) principal repayment at 
maturity. Consequently, the difference in interest payments on an annual basis is 
the savings that would accrue to a given airline as a result of moving up a notch 
or more in its credit rating. Thus, taking the same example cited in Method 1, the 
difference in interest payments for a BB- debt and a BB+ debt is discounted back 
at the average interest rates (yields) of a BB- debt and a BB+ debt in order to 
obtain the present value of the savings to the airline. This present value 
represents the savings in interest cost for a bullet debt issue.  
 
Method 3: Fully amortized debt - present value of interest savings. We 
assume, as in Method 1, that the debt is fully amortized over 12 years with equal 
annuity payments. However, our estimate of savings in this third approach uses 
only the difference in interest payments obtained in each year. As a result, over 
the entire life of the loan, we calculate separately (1) that component of the 
annuity payment which constitutes repayment of the principal and (2) that part of 
the annuity that constitutes interest. We calculate the difference in the interest 
components of the two annuities in each year and discount this series of 
payment differences by the average of the two interest rates. This method 
focuses on the savings in interest costs achieved in each year.  
 
 Method 3 used in calculating savings is thus similar to Method 1, although  
it results in savings estimates that are greater than Method 1. The reason is that 
during the initial years of repayment of the loan, most of the annuity payment 
would go toward repaying the interest component. Thus, the difference in interest 
components of the annuity payment is likely to be higher than the difference of 
the annuity payments in the initial years of the loan and lower in the final years of 
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the loan. Since the discounting of the initial years is lower, Method 3 would in 
general yield a higher present value than Method 1.7  
 
5. Analysis  
We obtained data from the following sources. The average values of the 
yield to maturity of bonds of different rating classes were obtained from Standard 
and Poor’s and Citigroup. Each of these represented the average of month-end 
values for the year 2003 – see Table 2.  We use these average values as the 
estimate of financing costs for new issuers that undertake issues at the given 
rating. The rating classes used were AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB+, BB, BB- and CCC. 
Issuers with a D rating have defaulted, and therefore were not considered in this 
study. We also obtained from the Thomson Financial Security Data Corporation 
New Issues Database (SDC) the yields to maturity on newly issued bonds in 
2003. We focused only on bonds that are non-convertible, have no call 
provisions, and are not linked to equity issues or unit issues. We excluded 
floating rate bonds. 
                                                 
7 To illustrate this, consider the following example: Suppose the interest rate before adoption of 
the Protocol was 10% (Loan 1) and after adoption of the Protocol, the interest rate reduced to 5% 
(Loan 2). The constant annuity payment that would repay a loan taken at the first interest rate 
would be $ 0.1128 per year for 12 years. The corresponding annuity payment for Loan 2 is 
$ 0.1468. Thus, Method 1 would calculate savings as the difference in these two annuity 
payments ($ 0.034) for 12 years at the average of the two interest rates (7.5%). However, the 
interest components of the loan in the first year are $0.10 and $0.05 for Loans 1 and 2 
respectively. The difference in the interest components of the loan is $0.05, which is greater than 
the difference of the annuity payments. As more of the principal amount is repaid, the difference 
in interest components would decline. In this particular example, the difference in interest 
payments in the last period (year 12) is $0.0079. The total sum of difference in interest payments 
is the same as the sum of the difference in annuity payments. However, Method 3 results in more 
of the savings accruing earlier than does Method 1.  
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We also investigated the difference in yields between secured and 
unsecured bonds. On average we find that the difference in average values of 
the yield to maturity between secured and unsecured bonds was 258 basis 
points (or 2.58%). For purposes of this study, we therefore assume that the 
difference in financing costs between secured and unsecured bonds is 250 basis 
points. This assumption is likely to provide an underestimate of the actual 
savings attributable to a secured bond issue relative to an unsecured one, which 
biases our estimates to the conservative end of probable outcomes. We assume 
that the secured rate is 40 basis points above the AAA yield in our sample. 
Based on a difference of 250 basis points between the secured and unsecured 
yields, this implies that the unsecured yield is 290 basis points above the AAA 
yield. 
 
5.1 Estimates of Cost Savings Accruing to Individual Airlines 
Table 2 shows the results of moving along the financing continuum (credit 
spectrum) per $1 (one dollar) principal of debt. This exhibit demonstrates the 
savings by of improving one rating, three ratings, or moving from an unsecured 
bond to a secured bond. Savings are calculated by three methods. In all cases, 
interest rates used are from Table 2. In Method 1, we assume that the loan is 
repaid in equal annual installments over 12 years.  The benefit of going from one 
category to another is the present value of the different in annuity payments for 
loans at each of the two interest rates. We discount this difference in annuity 
payments at the average of the two interest rates. In Method 2, we assume that 
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the loan principal amount is repaid fully only at maturity (i.e. after 12 years). We 
discount the difference in interest payments of loans for a period of 12 years 
assuming annual repayment at an interest rate equal to the average of the two 
interest rates. In Method 3, we assume that the loan is repaid in equal annual 
installments as in Method 1. However, we find the present value of only the 
difference in interest payments (i.e. the difference in the part of the annuity 
payment that goes to repaying the interest alone, and not the principal). We 
discount this difference in interest payments at an average of the two interest 
rates. All savings are per dollar of loan amount.  
We find that rating increases lead to significant savings in present value 
terms for all methods used and for all types of debt. Most significantly, a move 
from a CCC rating to a BB- rating (a move of one notch only) results in a 
minimum present value cost saving of 33% (or 33 cents per $1) over a 12 year 
debt maturity horizon. While moves within the A category do not appear to result 
in large savings, most other rating moves result in cost savings of at least 5% or 
5 cents per dollar of debt. Given the size of the capital investment required for 
aircraft, even small percentage savings add up to significant absolute savings in 
dollar terms.  
 
5.2 Cost Savings at the Country Level 
 To calculate the benefits for each country in the aggregate, one needs 
additional data with regard to demand for aircraft financing. We use two 
approaches to estimate this demand.  
 15
First, we calculate the total number of aircraft departures worldwide using 
the World Development Indicators 2003. For each country, we then use the 
percentage of departures in that country relative to the worldwide total as our first 
estimate of the fraction of the total worldwide demand for aircraft attributable to a 
given country. We multiply this fraction by the total [Boeing, 2004] predicted 
demand for aircraft over the 20 years to obtain the dollar estimate of demand for 
aircraft in the given country.  The overall amount is estimated at $2 trillion in total 
in 2003 dollars. This estimate of future demand will be henceforth referred to as 
the “Aircraft Departures Forecast.”  
Our second set of estimates for aircraft demand comes directly from 
Boeing [2004], henceforth referred to as the “Boeing Forecast.” The 
disadvantage of this second set of estimates is that it provides forecasts for only 
74 countries. The first approach provides estimates for 149 countries. The 
advantage of the Boeing estimates is that these are likely to be much more 
precise, since the information used by Boeing in its forecasts is likely to be much 
more comprehensive and granular, taking into account future macro-economic 
and political conditions as well as other proprietary market research.  
Having obtained aggregate dollar demand for future aircraft using one of 
the two approached described above, we estimate savings that would accrue to 
the given country if it acceded Cape Town Convention and Protocol using three 
different methods. 
We can use one of the two estimates of future aircraft demand in dollars 
and multiply it by the potential total dollar savings for the different sets of rating 
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increases attributable to the legal initiative. This provides an estimate of the 
potential savings in financing costs at the country level. Recall that one can 
estimate savings per dollar in three ways, and there are several possible 
increases in rating categories.  
We present results in the aggregate level – for the world as a whole and 
for countries into World Bank designated income groups. are (i) High Income, (ii) 
Low Income, (iii) Lower Middle Income and (iv) Upper Middle Income. We 
present results both for the total savings that would accrue to all countries in 
each group as a whole as well as average savings that may be expected per 
country.8 In Table 1a, we examine the impact going from an unsecured bond 
rating to a secured bond rating using the World Development Indictor (WDI) 
estimate of aircraft demand, and savings using various possible rating moves.  
It is important to point out that the savings per country that are calculated 
in these tables assume that all airlines in the given country go from a given rating 
to another rating. They do not depend on any improvement in the sovereign 
rating. For example, the minimum savings over 20 years for China amount to a 
present-value $76 billion on a total predicted demand of $183 billion over the 
2004-2023 period using the Boeing forecast. This cost calculation assumes that 
all airlines in China go from a CCC rating to a BBB rating as a consequence of 
China’s benefiting from the Cape Town Convention and Protocol. Clearly, this 
assumption may not be valid for all airlines in China – some may have a rating of 
CCC, others may already have a BBB rating. We find that a move of all airlines in 
                                                 
8 These total savings assume that each country in the given group signs the Aircraft Protocol.  
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China from CCC to BB- would result in a minimum combined savings of $60 
billion. 
   
 5.2.1 Direct Cost Savings Using Country-level Lending Rates 
 The previous section discussed the impact of savings that would accrue to 
a given country’s airlines based on different sets of rating increases for airlines in 
the given country. However, the interest rates upon which these were based are 
US corporate bond rates for each of the rating categories. Currently, these are 
not likely to be the borrowing rates available to airlines in many emerging market 
countries, since many do not have access to US or European bond markets or 
the offshore Eurobond market. Consequently, the appropriate benchmark rates in 
this case would be the domestic lending (loan) rates in each of these countries.  
  In particular, we assume that the cost of borrowing for an airline in a given 
country is the domestic lending rate of that country as stated in the World Bank’s 
Development Indicators 9  This is a reasonable assumption, especially for 
developing countries, since airlines in these countries are unlikely to have access 
to international financing due to inadequate legal protections of creditors. Once a 
given country signs and ratifies the Cape Town Convention and Protocol, 
however, external financing is likely to be available, and therefore international 
financing rates (both loans and bonds) would become available to airlines in 
these markets.  
                                                 
9 Caution should be used in interpreting these results. In particular, the lending rates in several 
emerging markets are not market determined lending rates, but rather government controlled 
rates. 
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International lending contracts frequently price interest rates above some 
benchmark rate. One frequently used benchmark rate is the London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR). Even loans that are not explicitly benchmarked to this 
interest rates are, in fact, implicitly linked to this rates since it represents the 
interest rate available to the most creditworthy borrowers.  
 We assume that an airline that issues debt protected by the  Convention’s  
Protocol would secure a loan at an interest rate equal to the 365 day LIBOR rate 
plus 40 bp. For purposes of our calculations, we use the underlying average 
month-end LIBOR rates for year 2003. These data were obtained from the 
Datastream database. 10  Specifically, we compare savings if the loan were 
obtained at LIBOR + 40 basis points -- the loan rate for secured international 
borrower -- relative to the domestic lending rate in the given country in 2003, 
using the three methods of savings enumerated in earlier sections of this paper.  
 The results of these secured loans cost savings (e.g., domestic loan rate 
minus LIBOR + 40 bp) attributable to secured loans are shown in aggregate in 
Table 4, under the four designated World Bank Income Groups.  
 
 
                                                 
10 In the earlier section and in exhibit 1, we had assumed a secured lending rate of AAA yield + 
40 basis points, i.e., we assumed that the benchmark rate was the AAA yield and secured loan 
had a spread of 40 basis points over AAA. The analysis in that section and exhibit 2 was more in 
the spirit of a "what-if" analysis scenario analysis. Here, we try to get closer the actual data to find 
which benchmark rates are actually used for secured debt issues. Upon examination of data from 
the SDC database of secured debt issues, we found that all debt issues where a benchmark rate 
was explicitly specified used either the 1-month LIBOR rate or the 3-month LIBOR rate as the 
benchmark rate. By using the 365-day LIBOR interest rate (which will be higher than the 1 month 
and 3 month interest rate due to the term premium), we obtain an estimate of savings lower than 
what it would be if the actual benchmark LIBOR rates were used. This estimate of secured debt 
financing interest rate is a more realistic approximation than that used earlier.  
 19
5.2.2 Direct Cost Saving Attributable to Secured Borrowing 
 The calculations summarized in Table 4 contain a large number of 
possible results for different rating, security and model scenarios.  Different 
scenarios will be of interest to different countries and airlines. Table 5 shows the 
mean country and total cost savings, in millions of 2003 dollars, for countries in 
each World Bank designated income group in going from unsecured to secured 
borrowing. 
In terms of aggregate present value Worldwide savings over 20 years 
Method 1 shows $267 billion in cost savings while Methods 2 and 3 show $299 
billion and $290 billion respectively. Since the Boeing forecast suggests a 20 
year demand for aircraft in 2003 of $2 trillion, this represents total cost savings of 
between 10% and 15% due to the  Protocol in terms of new aircraft financing. It 
can be argued that some high-income countries such as the US and Canada 
already have protection for secured creditors comparable to that envisaged by 
the Cape Town Convention and Protocol. If one were to exclude the US, UK and 
Canada from the calculation of aggregate savings, we obtain aggregate savings 
of $149 billion and $223 billion. Thus, exclusion of such countries still results in 
materially large estimates for gains to countries on aggregate. There are also 
significant savings for low income countries of between $8 to $12 billion, 
depending on which of the three cost savings methods of estimation are used.  
Indeed on average low-income countries would save between $216 million and 
$322 million. See Table 5. 
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 While the mean of the aggregate savings for countries migrating from a 
BBB rating to AAA is $1.2 billion, for individual countries such as China the 
savings would be much higher.  Based on the estimated value of future deliveries 
over 20 years of $91 billion, China would be estimated to save between $8 billion 
and $12 billion in financing costs, depending on which of the three methods is 
used.11 Based on the Boeing aircraft delivery estimate of $183 billion and the 
applicable interest rate , the savings are estimated to be between $38 billion and 
$62 billion.  
Similarly, India is estimated to save between $10.4 billion and $15.7 billion 
based on a Boeing estimate of future demand of $ 20 billion. Thus, the present 
value savings are estimated to be over 50% of the actual principal amount 
needed to purchase aircraft. For Brazil, the savings amount also exceeds the 
principal amount of the aircraft financings – on a Boeing-estimated demand of 
$32.5 billion, Brazil can expect to save between $53 billion and $59 billion.  
 The aggregate global cost savings range between $494 billion to $729 
billion or approximately 15% to 20% of the expected cost of the future (20 year) 
demand for airline deliveries (in 2003 dollars). If we exclude the US, UK and 
Canada from these estimates, we obtain estimates for aggregate savings to lie 
between $371 billion to $524 billion. As can be seen from these examples, the 
expected cost savings over 20 years - even for lower income countries - as a 
result of the adoption of Cape Town Convention and Protocol are likely to be very 
material indeed. 
                                                 
11 Standard & Poors assigns a sovereign debt rating of BBB to China in 2003. Thus, the cost 
saving here is probably close to the actual savings to China.  
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5.2.3 Cost Savings Based on Sovereign Rating 
 Finally, we compute another set of estimates on a country-by-country 
basis for all countries where a sovereign debt rating was assigned by Standard 
and Poor’s in 2004. For each of these countries, we compute present-value 
savings using both the Boeing estimate of aircraft demand and the aircraft 
departures forecast. For countries where the Boeing forecast was available, we 
present results for this forecast. For countries where the Boeing forecast was not 
available, we estimate cost savings using the aircraft departures forecast. Most 
airlines in a country will typically have ratings that are lower than or equal to the 
sovereign rating of a given country. For example, in the United States (sovereign 
rating of AAA), only one airline company had a debt rating of AAA and only 18 
corporations in total had a rating of AAA.12  
This approach to estimating cost savings can be illustrated using Turkey 
as an example. Turkey has an aircraft demand of $20 billion using the Boeing 20-
year forecast, and had a sovereign rating of B in 2003 assigned by S&P. Given 
that the rating increases in our sample do not have a sovereign debt rating of B, 
we assume that the corporate rating of BB- corresponds to a sovereign rating of 
B.13 Companies in Turkey would tend to have ratings that are lower than BB- 
when accessing international financing markets. This implies that they should 
have rating of CCC or below. For Turkey, the minimum savings would then be 
                                                 
12 This was found using the rating of long term debt in 2003 of the given companies from the 
Standard and Poor’s Compustat database which provides information of financial statements of 
companies operating in the U.S. 
 
13 This would result in an underestimate of savings as the rating of B is actually lower than the 
BB- rating.  
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about $6.6 billion if its airlines achieved even a single notch increase in rating on 
account of signing the  Protocol.  
 
5.3. Impact on Ratings 
 In this section, we analyze the impact of signing the Protocol on the 
sovereign rating of the country that signs the Protocol. We also analyze the 
likelihood of a rating increase on account of a change in the debt structure from 
unsecured to secured from the perspective of airline companies.  Lastly, we 
analyze the impact of an increase in rating on the overall interest cost of the 
company, even if the debt is not covered by the Protocol.  
Rating agencies use numerous operating and financial measures for an 
issuer before assigning a rating to the given company. The goal is to find what 
effect a reduction in interest rates due to the signing of the Protocol would have 
on an airline’s credit rating.   
Here we use the Standard and Poor’s Compustat database to obtain 
information on the rating on the long term debt of a given airline as well as 
financial information required to compute the four accounting variables -- profit 
margin (defined as EBITDA to sales), total assets, leverage and interest rate 
(defined as the interest expense to book value of long term debt) in 2003.14 
Given that our earlier analysis focused only on companies that have a rating of 
                                                 
14 The rating in the database is the rating of the given company given by S&P itself. While the 
Compustat database covers most public companies listed in the U.S, ratings are not available for 
all companies.  
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CCC or higher, we present results for ratings from AAA to CCC.15 Out of the total 
of 1,873 airlines, only 18 have a rating of AAA. Thus, despite the AAA sovereign 
rating of the US, a majority of the American companies have ratings significantly 
lower. In this sample, BBB is the most common rating for airlines.  
The benchmark reduction in interest rate that we will consider is 250 basis 
points. Recall from our earlier analysis that secured interest rate was lower than 
the unsecured interest rate by 2.58% (or 258 basis points). If a given airline were 
to retire all of its existing debt and reissue that debt as secured debt, which would 
result in an overall reduction in its interest cost of about 2.5%. Would this result in 
an increase in rating? If so, how much would this increase be?  
 In general, companies with a higher rating tend to pay a significantly lower 
interest rate on debt, have lower leverage, exhibit higher profit margins and are 
larger as measured by total assets. We can identify what would happen if the 
interest rate on a company’s entire debt experienced a reduction of 250 basis 
points. Suppose an airline with a CCC rating was paying a median interest rate of 
10.67%. If that airline experienced a reduction of 250 basis points, its interest 
rate would fall to 8.17%. As a comparison, the typical company with one higher 
rating of B had a median interest rate of 8.73%. Thus, reduction of this interest 
rate would make this airline more similar to peer companies in the B category.  
Similarly, the median interest rate paid by a BBB company was 5.99%. A 
decrease of 250 basis points in its interest cost would result in an average 
                                                 
15 We winsorize all variables at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimize the impact of outliers on our 
analysis.  
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interest cost of 3.49%. As a comparison, AAA companies had an average 
interest cost of 3.54%.  
It is important to recognize in this analysis that the interest rate is 
determined by several factors such as the risk of an airline’s operations, its 
leverage, the state of the economy in which the airline operates, and so on. The 
signing of the Cape Town Convention and Protocol (and the existence of the 
Registry) would result in a reduction of the risk to airline bondholders in the event 
of bankruptcy. This would likely lower the interest rate due to a reduction in the 
time it would take to repossess the aircraft in the event of bankruptcy. However, 
the rating of the company is also determined by several factors that are common 
to those that determine the interest rate such as leverage, risk and so on. 
Therefore, we cannot definitively conclude that a lower interest cost in isolation, 
without any other improvements in performance, would result in a higher rating – 
the reason being that companies with higher ratings also tend to have lower 
leverage and better profit margins. However, the large magnitude of interest cost 
difference between secured and unsecured debt would create conditions that 
could result in an increase in rating of at least one notch and quite likely an 
increase of more than one notch as well. 
 
5.4 Rating Increases and Overall Interest Costs 
Here we extend this analysis by examining the impact of a rating change 
on the overall interest cost of an airline. The goal is to assess the impact of a 
rating change that would likely occur on account of an airline issuing debt under 
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the Cape Town Convention and Protocol on the interest payments it pays on its 
entire debt. We use the Standard and Poor’s Compustat database to obtain 
financial and rating information on companies. Our methodology involves using 
the interest rate (defined as the ratio of interest expense to book value of long 
term debt) as the dependent variable and examining the impact of a change in 
rating on this interest rate. One observation consists of the interest rate paid by a 
given airline in a given year.  
Since rating changes are relatively infrequent events, we examine all 
companies that had a rating available in the 5 years from 1999 to 2003. A rating 
increase of 1 notch is coded as +1 for the rating increase independent variable. 
Rating increase of 2 notches will be coded as +2. Similarly, a rating decrease of 
1 notch is coded as -1. If a company has no rating change from the previous year, 
the rating increase variable is takes a value of 0. We use ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression to explain the interest rate paid by a given company. Our model 
is of the following form.  
Interest Rate = F(Increase in Rating from previous year, Control Variables) 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we include the following control variables 
that are likely to be relevant in the determination of the interest rate: profit margin, 
leverage, and company size as measured by log of its total assets. In addition, 
we include dummy variables for each rating and the year of measurement. We 
also include dummy variables for the year of measurement to account for year-
specific movements in interest rate.  
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Table 6 displays the results of this regression. We conduct analysis that 
examines the impact of an increase in rating for all companies as well as subsets 
of companies in different rating subsets. For the overall sample, we find that an 
increase in a rating of 1 notch leads to a reduction in the overall interest rate paid 
by the company of about 0.51%. This magnitude of reduction in interest rates is 
significant for several sub-samples as well.  
 
5.5.  Impact on Sovereign Rating and Indirect Benefits 
Many airlines in developing countries are either state-owned or companies 
where the state has a controlling ownership stake.  Often, the governments in 
developing countries guarantee the debt of certain state-owned enterprises. To 
the extent that signing and ratification the Cape Town Convention and Protocol 
allows these carriers to independently raise capital, it is likely that the sovereign 
ratings of the country may also improve. However, to compute this possible 
increase in sovereign ratings, one would need detailed information on the level of 
state guarantees - which is not available in our dataset. Thus, the savings 
estimates that we present above are exclusively savings that would accrue to 
airlines operating in these countries. The potential reduction in sovereign 
guarantees would likely result in positive spillover effects in terms of reduction of 
the cost of capital to the rest of the economy. However, it is not possible to gauge 
the magnitude of this effect with the current dataset.  
 Taking the example of China once again, we find that it had a sovereign 
rating of BBB in 2004. Thus, airlines domiciled in China would have a rating of at 
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most BBB. Even if these airlines increased their ratings by 1 notch (i.e. from BBB 
to A), the minimum savings that would accrue to China would be $13.3 billion. 
The actual savings would of course depend on the distribution of ratings among 
Chinese airlines and the magnitude of rating increases that may accrue to each 
individual airline as a result of China’s signing and ratifying the Convention and 
benefiting from the Cape Town Convention and Protocol.  
 
5.6. Effects on Airline Share Prices 
All of the foregoing analysis is based on assumptions regarding the 
structure of savings attributable to the Cape Town Convention and Protocol and 
then derive the magnitude of savings under various assumptions. An alternative 
method of analyzing the effect of policy changes such as these - without making 
any assumption about the structure of savings that would accrue from them - is 
the “event study” methodology, a widely used technique in empirical corporate 
finance to evaluate the impact of an event using stock price data. Under some 
plausible assumptions, one can isolate the effect of an event – in this case the 
signing and ratification of the Cape Town Convention and Protocol – on the 
return on a stock (airline stocks in this instance) over and above some 
benchmark market index return (the so called “abnormal” or “excess” return).  
A problem with using event study methodology in this context is that the 
methodology is well suited for events that are not anticipated and have a short 
duration (approximately 1-2 days). As the duration increases, or if the event is 
partially anticipated, the power of this method to detect the true abnormal effect 
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of the event decreases - i.e., the event study method would not detect any effect 
even though the true effect may be significant.16 Indeed, the signing and the 
ratification of the Cape Town Convention and Protocol was a fairly long process. 
The following timeline illustrates its signing and ratification in the United States.   
• May 9, 2003 – US signs Cape Town convention Aircraft Protocol 
• Nov 5, 2003 – US president urges senate to approve Aircraft Protocol. 
• July 22, 2004 – US senate approves treaty 
• Aug 9, 2004 – US president signs treaty 
• Oct 28, 2004 - US ratifies treaty 
It is evident from the above that the event of the US ratifying the treaty 
would have been partially anticipated well before the actual date of ratification. 
Therefore, instead of using the conventional two-day event window, we use a 30 
day window around the event date (15 days before and 15 days after 
ratification).17 This results in a total of 23 days trading days where airline stock 
price data are available.  
Press coverage around the ratification date suggests that several other 
signatory countries were expected to sign the Convention once the US acceded 
to it. Given that the US ratification was the main event that several other 
countries were awaiting, we use this (ratification) date as the event date to 
compute the effect of the signing and ratification on stockholders of airline 
companies.  
                                                 
16 See Thompson[19950.  
17 Use of longer event window has been done in the cases where the event is partially anticipated 
in Dahiya et al [ 2003].  
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We examine the “abnormal return” or “excess return” on various airline 
stock indices available in the Datastream database. We choose those countries 
that had signed the Cape Town Convention and Protocol and had an airline 
index available.18 Out of the list of signatory countries to date, we were able to 
obtain airline stock index data for the following countries – Canada, Chile, China, 
France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom and 
United States. In addition, we were able to obtain a world airline stock price index 
as well as an emerging markets airline stock price index.  
We compute the effect of the US ratification by two methods. First, we 
compute the excess return of the given airline index over the market index in the 
given country.19 For the world and emerging markets airline index, we use the US 
total market return as the benchmark return index. Our results suggest that there 
are significant benefits to signing the Protocol.  
Table 7 summarizes these results. It shows that the world airline index 
had a cumulative abnormal return of 9.58 % over the 30 day event window 
around the US ratification. This return is statistically different from zero and is 
also economically significant. Most other countries tend to have positive 
abnormal returns as well, although only the returns from China and South Africa 
are statistically significant with cumulative returns of 9.48% and 13.21% 
                                                 
18 Where available, we use the Dow Jones Airline index of the given country. Where the Dow 
Jones index is not available, we use the Datastream airlines and ports index.  
 
19 All returns are in US dollar terms.  
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respectively.20  Using an alternative “event study” methodology, we find evidence 
of significant wealth gains for airline shareholders  around the date then the US 
ratified the Cape Town Convention and Protocol. The gains computed here are 
completely independent of the methodology adopted in earlier sections. This 
suggests that the reduction in cost of debt attributable to the ratification resulted 
in a value gain to airline equity holders of at least 10%.  
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 We estimate that the adoption of the Cape Town Convention and 
Protocol would result in several types of savings for airlines and potentially for 
governments.  
First, countries that sign and ratify the Cape Town Convention and Protocol 
would give their airlines access to capital at more competitive international 
financing rates. This access would lead to major reductions in financing costs, 
especially for airlines in developing countries which would benefit from reduced 
sovereign risk in addition to reduced credit risk facing lenders and investors. 
Using the domestic benchmark interest rate as the lending rate in a given country 
                                                 
20 The method above assumes that the return of the airline index on the market had a β or 
market sensitivity of 1. We relax this assumption in the next set of regressions where we regress 
the return on the airline indices on the market return over a period starting 365 days before the 
event date and ending 15 days after the event date. This results in a total of 273 days of trading 
data. This method allows for potentially varying dependence of the return of the airline index on 
the benchmark return index. Table 14b shows the results of this analysis. We find that airline 
indices in the world as a whole, the United States, Germany and South Africa showed significant 
economic effects of ratification of the treaty by the United States. Germany had a coefficient 
estimate of 0.5094. The interpretation of this coefficient is that there was an abnormal daily return 
of 0.5094% or 11.71% over the 23 trading day event period. Similarly, South Africa had a 
coefficient estimate of 0.5848 that corresponds to a cumulative abnormal return of 13.45%. For 
the world as a whole, the regression coefficient of 0.5590 implies a cumulative abnormal return of 
12.85%. These estimates are fairly close to those obtained above.  
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and the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) as the international benchmark 
rate, we find that the average country in the data sample would save, in 
aggregate, between $7.6 billion and $11.1 billion over the 20-year estimation 
period, and that the average low-income country would save between $4.6 and 
$6.8 billion, based on Boeing’s forecast for future aircraft orders between 2004 
and 2023. Low-income countries stand to gain the most by access to 
international financing rates, followed by lower middle-income countries and 
upper middle-income countries. These are joint gains, which accrue to the 
airlines in the form of lower-cost of capital and to their home countries in the form 
of lower-cost external debt. 
Second, the Cape Town Convention and Protocol (and the Registry) will 
provide enhanced ability for airlines (especially in developing countries) to take 
advantage of lower secured financing rates. We estimate that the difference in 
the secured and unsecured interest rate is approximately 2.5% (or 250 basis 
points). We estimate that this difference would lead to interest savings of 
between 13% and 20% per dollar of principal borrowed for aircraft financings that 
are not already covered by protections comparable to those provided by the 
Cape Town Convention and Protocol. 
Third, the Cape Town Convention and Protocol will likely result in a 
reduction in sovereign guarantees required for airline financing and a consequent 
improvement in overall sovereign debt ratings.  This is a collateral gain for 
governments not included in the direct benefits.  As the relatively large financial 
guarantees normally required for these types of purchases are no longer 
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applicable for ratifying countries, the consequent improvement in government 
balance sheets should improve their overall credit rating and free up scarce 
capital for other uses. 
Fourth, signing and ratifying the Cape Town Convention and Protocol will 
also likely result in credit rating improvements for airlines. An increase in airline 
credit ratings would lead to further reductions in the interest costs for the affected 
carriers as a whole, extending to debt not covered directly by the Protocol.  Thus, 
the Cape Town Convention and Protocol results in two benefits to airlines – a 
direct benefit in terms of reduction of interest costs for aircraft financed by 
secured lending subject to the terms of the Protocol, and an indirect benefit in 
terms of a better overall rating for all debt issued by the airline concerned. We 
find that a rating increase leads to a reduction of at least 0.5% in interest cost on 
the overall debt of an airline company based on a regression analysts that 
yielded statistically significant results. 
Fifth, signing and ratifying the Cape Town Convention and harvesting the 
benefits of the Protocol will likely increase the stock market valuation of publicly-
traded airlines by at least 10%. This estimate is based on an “event study” of the 
reaction of the stock market to the US signature and ratification process during 
2003 and 2004. 
Although we have limited our study to the economic benefits available for 
the future purchase of aircraft, there are additional benefits for the purchase of 
engines and helicopters. In particular, this Registry will be the first and only 
registry available to record the financial interests in aircraft engines, so the 
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economic benefits available to aircraft will also likely extend to the purchase and 
financing of engines.  In particular, it is likely to give airlines a range of more 
flexible financing arrangements, since these assets are even more mobile than 
the aircraft themselves and have to be changed frequently for operational 
reasons. 
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Worldwide demand for commercial airplanes 25000 units 
Worldwide demand for commercial airplanes in 2003 dollars $ 2 trillion 
World Economic growth per year 3.0% 
Passenger traffic growth per year 5.2 % 
Cargo traffic growth per year 6.2% 
 
Table 1
Global Commercial Aircraft Demand Vectors 2004-2023*
* Based on Boeing Current Market Outlook, 2004.
 
 
Table 2
Interest Rates Used to Calculate Savings 
 
This exhibit demonstrates yields used in this study. All variables are 
average values based on monthly closing values for year 2003. The values 
for yields of different rating bonds were obtained from Salomon yield book 
and Standard and Poor's. The 365 days LIBOR rate and the inflation value 
for U.K were obtained from World Development Indicators 2003. The 
secured interest rate was assumed to be 40 basis points over the AAA yield. 
The unsecured interest rate was assumed to be 250 basis points above the 
secured interest rate. 
 
AAA yield 5.24% 
AA yield 5.33% 
A yield 5.59% 
BBB yield 6.93% 
BB+ yield 8.26% 
BB yield 8.57% 
BB- yield 8.62% 
CCC yield 15.81% 
Secured yield 5.64% 
Unsecured yield 8.14% 
365 day US$ LIBOR rate 1.37% 
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Exhibit 2 
Saving per Dollar of Principal Amount Borrowed Due to Rating 
Increase 
 
Method 1  
Benefit of going from AA to AAA  $               0.0050  
Benefit of going from A to AA  $               0.0145  
Benefit of going from BBB to A  $               0.0729  
Benefit of going from BB+ to BBB  $               0.0697  
Benefit of going from BB to BB+  $               0.0159  
Benefit of going from BB- to BB  $               0.0025  
Benefit of going from CCC to BB-  $               0.3306  
Benefit of going from CCC to BBB  $               0.4176  
Benefit of going from BBB to AAA  $               0.0924  
Benefit of going from Unsecured to Secured  $               0.1336  
  
Method 2  
Benefit of going from AA to AAA  $               0.0079  
Benefit of going from A to AA  $               0.0225  
Benefit of going from BBB to A  $               0.1108  
Benefit of going from BB+ to BBB  $               0.1024  
Benefit of going from BB to BB+  $               0.0229  
Benefit of going from BB- to BB  $               0.0037  
Benefit of going from CCC to BB-  $               0.4410  
Benefit of going from CCC to BBB  $               0.5665  
Benefit of going from BBB to AAA  $               0.1410  
Benefit of going from Unsecured to Secured  $               0.1997  
  
Method 3  
Benefit of going from AA to AAA  $               0.0054  
Benefit of going from A to AA  $               0.0156  
Benefit of going from BBB to A  $               0.0789  
Benefit of going from BB+ to BBB  $               0.0761  
Benefit of going from BB to BB+  $               0.0174  
Benefit of going from BB- to BB  $               0.0028  
Benefit of going from CCC to BB-  $               0.3679  
Benefit of going from CCC to BBB  $               0.4638  
Benefit of going from BBB to AAA  $               0.0998  
Benefit of going from Unsecured to Secured  $               0.1452  
 
  
 
Income group 
Range of savings per 
dollar of principal borrowed 
Range of savings per 
country in $ billion 
High Income Countries 15%-25% $ 8.8- $ 14.4 
Low Income Countries 55%-82% $ 4.6- $ 6.8 
Lower Middle Income Countries 45%-62% $10.2- $14.3 
Upper Middle Income Countries 36%-56% $ 2.9 - $ 4.4 
 
Table 4
Benefits Based on Access to International Financing
(present-value,  per World Bank country designations based on aircraft departures)
¾ Mean savings per country in sample, 2004-2023 $7.6-11.1 billion.
¾ Mean savings per low-income country in sample, 2004-2023      $4.6-6.8 billion.
¾ Estimates based on 2003 domestic benchmark lending  rates for countries in 
sample vs. LIBOR+40bp as the benchmark international lending rate.
Note: These are joint gains accruing to the airlines (cost of capital) and their
home countries (cost of external debt).
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Income group Range of savings per country in $ billion 
High Income Countries                      $ 5.5 - $ 6.0 
Low Income Countries                      $ 1.0 - $ 1.5 
Lower Middle Income Countries                      $ 2.3 - $ 3.5 
Upper Middle Income Countries                      $ 1.1 - $ 1.7 
 
Table 5
Benefits Based on Access to Secured Financing
(present-value,  per World Bank country designations using Boeing forecasts)
¾ Interest cost savings estimated at between 13% and 20% of principal borrowed
for aircraft financings not already covered by protections comparable to the
Cape Town Convention and Protocol.
Note: These are joint gains accruing to the airlines (cost of capital) and their
home countries (cost of external debt).
 
 
Median 
Leverage
Median 
Interest Rate
Median Total 
Assets                
(in $ million)
Median Profit 
Margin
Number of 
observations
AAA 7.08% 3.54% 93083 25.04% 18
AA 12.98% 3.52% 32696 23.51% 73
A 19.12% 5.22% 11475 22.52% 378
BBB 24.81% 5.99% 4977 18.78% 583
BB 34.20% 7.55% 1615 13.86% 426
B 50.27% 8.73% 742 14.70% 337
CCC 62.64% 10.67% 495 10.56% 58
Table 13a - Summary statistics based on ratingTable 6
Improvement in Airline Credit Ratings
(results of regression analysis)
(0.083)***(0.026)***(0.002)***(0.002)***(0.308)***
8912-0.5114-0.5588-0.0084-0.007915.4578
No. of 
observations
Increase in 
rating
Log of 
AssetsLeverage
Profit 
MarginIntercept
Regression Analysis: Impact of Rating Change on Interest Cost
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Table 7
Impact on Airline Stock Prices
(results of event study analysis )
Univariate Analysis
0.450.24%2.50%0.11%23Emerging Markets
1.780.23%9.58%0.42%23World
t statistic to test 
if mean 
significantly 
different from 0
Standard 
Deviation 
of Mean
Cumulative 
excess 
return over 
event period
Mean daily 
excess 
return over 
event period
Number of 
observationsCountry
(0.2059)***(0.0802)***(0.0596)**
0.349774.130.55900.9304-0.1247
Adjusted R2
F Value for
Regression
significance
Coefficient on
Dummy for event
period
Coefficient on
Overall Market
ReturnIntercept
Regression Analysis: Effect of U.S. Ratification
 
